The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (Arabic: Mu„hadat as-Sal`m al-Misréyah al-Isréyah; Hebrew: Heskem HaShalom Bein Yisrael LeMitzrayim was created on March 26, 1979 in Washington, D.C. The treaty between Egypt and Israel was signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and was attested by US President Jimmy Carter. [1] As part of the agreement, the United States began to provide economic and military assistance to Egypt and to support its successive governments politically. Among the Camp David peace accords from 1978 to 2000, the United States subsidized the Egyptian armed forces with more than $38 billion in aid. Egypt receives about $1.3 billion a year. [15] Carter`s advisers insisted on the development of an Israeli-Egyptian agreement that would lead to a possible solution to the Palestinian issue. They believed in a short, loose and undistorted link between the two countries, which was strengthened by the creation of a coherent basis for a settlement. However, Mr. Carter felt that they were „not aiming high enough” and was interested in creating a written „Land for Peace” agreement with Israel, which restores the Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank. [13] On several occasions, the Egyptian and Israeli leaders sought to abolish the negotiations, only to be re-enchanted in the process by Carter`s personal appeals. This was due to the zeal of NATO countries to improve Egypt`s troubled economy, the belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on those of the Arab world, and the hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and its other Arab neighbours and help solve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Begin`s reaction to Sadat`s initiative, even if sadat or Carter had not hoped, showed a willingness to engage the Egyptian head of state. Like Sadat, Begin saw many reasons why bilateral discussions would be in his country`s best interest.

It would give Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt, rather than with a larger Arab delegation that might try to use its size to make unwelcome or unacceptable demands. Israel believed that Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and eastern communists. Moreover, the opening of direct negotiations between the heads of state and government – the diplomacy of the summit – would distinguish Egypt from its Arab neighbours. Carter`s people apparently had no idea of the secret talks in Morocco between Dayan and Sadat`s representative, Hassan Tuhami, which paved the way for Sadat`s initiative. In fact, Egypt and Israel somehow piled up to drive Carter out of his footsteps in Geneva. The basic message of Sadat`s speech to the Knesset was the call for the implementation of resolutions 242 and 338. Sadats` visit was the first step towards negotiations such as the provisional conference in Cairo in December 1977. [citation needed] The UN General Assembly rejected the middle East peace framework, as the agreement was reached without the participation of the United Nations and the PLO and not the Palestinian right to return, self-determination and national independence and sovereignty.

イージー ブースト 偽物 通販